


Part I: Presumption of innocence


Part III: Legal Aid

Part III: Children's Rights in criminal proceedings




ECHR • Art 6 para 2 **Normative** references **EU Law** • Art 48 para 1 EU CFR • Directive 2016/343







- Respect of the Pol implies that a conviction cannot be based solely or mainly on the defendant's silence
- However, the RTS is a relative
- Adverse inferences from the silence "in situations that clearly call for an explanation" (John Murray v UK § 47, Ibrahim and *Others v UK* § 269)




- The Pol requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof with regard to the charges against the accused (Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain, § 77)
- It follows that, in principle, the Pol is violated if the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defence (John Murray v UK, § 54) and also that any doubt should benefit the accused
- However...



- Presumptions of fact or law can be allowed "within reasonable limits" (Salabiaku v France, § 28; Radio France and others v France, § 24)
- In particular, striking a balance between the importance of the protected interests and the rights of the defence
- Such presumptions must be rebuttable

Pol, premature expressions and public references to guilt

- The Pol requires also judicial authorities to refrain from premature expressions of guilt before the accused has been formally declared guilty according to the law (Kangers v Latvia, § 60)
- Separation of cases presenting "strong factual ties" must be carefully assessed (Navalnyy and Ofitserov v Russia, § 104)
- Parallel proceedings against co-suspects: references to the co-suspects tried separately must be made only if indispensable and worded in such a way to avoid potential pre-judgment about their guilt (Karaman v Germany, § 64)




Case law on Pol and RTS as general principles:

- Orkem v Commission (C-374/87)
- Spector Photo (C-45/08)

Case law on the **2016 Directive** on the Pol:


- *Milev* (C-310/18 PPU)
- RH (C-8/19 PPU)
- AH and Others (C-377/18)
- *DK* (C-653/19 PPU)

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
To date 3 cases on the applicability of the 2016 Directive in regard to

- Milev: extension of pretrial detention ("reasonable grounds")
 - **RH:** extension of pretrial detention, evaluation of evidentiary elements
 - **DK:** re-examination of pretrial detention and burden of proof
- In all of the three occasions, the CJEU insisted on the minimal degree of harmonization of the Directive and that it does not govern the requirements and conditions for the adoption of decisions on pre-trial detention
- Such decisions, however, should not refer to the person in custody as being guilty



"Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, for as long as a suspect or an accused person has not been proved guilty according to law, public statements made by public authorities, and judicial decisions, other than those on guilt, do not refer to that person as being guilty. This shall be without prejudice to acts of the prosecution which aim to prove the guilt of the suspect or accused person, and to preliminary decisions of a procedural nature, which are taken by judicial or other competent authorities and which are based on suspicion or incriminating evidence."

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A **separate agreement** concluded with the prosecution by **only one (MH) of five codefendants** tried for **participation in a criminal organization**

The agreement contained an admission of guilt by MH and **reference to the other co-defendants** as members of the criminal organization

Is this **compatible with art 4 para 1** of the 2016 Directive?

The CJEU **recalled the ECtHR case law** in *Karaman v Germany* ad *Navalnyy and Ofitrov v Russia* and concluded that the reference to co-defendants tried separately is possible **only**:

- If necessary for the categorisation of the legal liability of the person entering the agreement
- Using a wording that clearly indicates that the guilt of the other co-defendants has not been legally established







Two **cumulative** conditions:

Means test: "some indications" are sufficient (Tsonyo Tsonev v Bulgaria n.2 § 39)

"Interests of justice" test:


- Seriousness of the offence
- Severity of the penalty
- Deprivation of liberty at stake (Quaranta v Switzerland § 33, Benham v UK § 61, Zdravko Stanev v Bulgaria § 38)
- Complexity of the case: f.i. unfamiliarity with the language or the legal system (Quaranta v Switzerland § 35, Twalib v Greece § 53)

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- Need to fully take into account age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings (T v UK, § 84).
- Need to take into account vulnerability and to ensure the effective participation and understanding of his/her rights since the early stage of the proceedings and waivers of rights should be admissible only if expressed unequivocally and in full awareness (Panovits v Cyprus, § 67-68, Salduz v Turkey, § 59-60)
- Detention of minors shall be the measure of last resort, shall last as short as possible and they shall be kept separate from adults (Nart v Turkey, § 31)




- "1. Member States shall ensure that the specific needs of children concerning protection, education, training and social integration are ataken into account
- 2. For that purpose children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings **shall** be individually assessed. The individual assessment shall, in particular, take into account the **child's personality** and **maturity**, the child's **economic**, **social and family background**, and any **specific vulnerabilities** that the child may have.

(...)


- 4. The individual assessment shall serve to establish and to note, in accordance with the recording procedure in the Member State concerned, such information about the individual characteristics and circumstances of the child as might be of use to the competent authorities when:
 - (a) determining whether any specific measure to the benefit of the child is to be taken;
 - (b) assessing the appropriateness and effectiveness of any **precautionary measures** in respect of the child;
 - (c) taking **any decision** or course of action in the criminal proceedings, including when **sentencing**.

(...)

- 9. Member States may derogate from the obligation to carry out an individual assessment where such a derogation is warranted in the circumstances of the case, provided that it is compatible with the child's best interests."
- Art 7 does not apply in EAW proceedings: see Art 17 of the 2016 Directive on minors $\,$



- Art 3 para 3 of the EAW FD provides a mandatory ground for refusal in regard to persons who may not, owing to their age, be criminally tried according to the law of the executing MS
- The case related a 17 years old residing in BE and subject to an EAW from PL. According to Belgian Law, minors between 16 and 18 years old can be subject to criminal proceedings only following an individual assessment
- The CJEU established that the executing authority must simply verify whether the person concerned has reached the minimum age required to be regarded as criminally responsible in the executing Member State without having to consider any additional conditions, or individual assessment
- Strict interpretation, functional to mutual recognition and justified also on the basis of the 2016 Directive on minors: its art 7 on individual assessment is not recalled among the guarantees provided for EAW proceedings (art 17)



ECtHR case law in order of reference (with hyperlinks)

- Funke v France, 1993, App n 10828/84
- Salduz v Turkey, 2008, App n 36391/02
- John Murray v UK, 1996, App n 18731/91
- *Ibrahim and Others v UK*, 2016, App n 50541/08
- Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain, 1988, App n 10590/83
- Salabiaku v France, 1988, App n 10519/83
- Radio France and Others v France, 2004, App n 53984/00
- Kangers v Latvia, 2019, App n 35726/10
- Navalnyy and Ofitserov v Russia, 2016, App n 46632/13
- Karaman v Germany, 2014, App n 17103/10
- *Tsonyo Tsonev v Bulgaria n 2*, 2010, App n 2376/03
- Quaranta v Switzerland, 1991, App n 12744/87
- *Benham v UK*, 1996, App n 19380/92
- Zdravko Stanev v Bulgaria, 2012, App n 32238/04
- Twalib v Greece, 1998, App n 24294/94

- Tv UK, 1999, App n 24724/94
- Panovits v Cyprus, 2009, App n 4268/04
- Nart v Turkey, 2008, App n 20817/04

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CJEU case law in order of reference (with hyperlinks)

- Orkem v Commission, 1989, C-374/87
- Spector Photo and Van Raemdonck, 2009, C-45/08
- Milev, 2018, C-310/18 PPU
- RH, 2019, C-8/19 PPU
- AH and Others, 2019, C-377/18
- DK (also known as Spetsializirana prokuratura), 2019, C-653/19 PPU
- Dawid Piotrowski, 2018, C-376/16